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TORTS-HUIANITARIAN DOCTRINE-PosITION OF PERiL-[Missouri].-
Plaintiff was standing between two parked automobiles. Defendant drove
past the parked cars and backed into the parking space in front of the first
car. In so doing the defendant pushed back the first parked car and crushed
the plaintiff between the first and second parked cars. Held, that there was
evidence that the plaintiff was in a position of peril at the time the de-
fendant began to back his car into the parking space, and especially at the
time the defendant started to push the first parked car backward toward
the plaintiff.' The dissenting opinion, however, stated that the plaintiff was
not in a position of peril, but only in a place where he might possibly be
injured if the defendant were negligent.
Plaintiff's basic contention under the humanitarian doctrine2 is that he
was in a position of peril.3 But the facts of this case indicate that the same
negligent act both gave rise to the peril and caused the injury. Is the
application of the humanitarian doctrine proper in such a case? The
Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. Vulgamott v. Trimble4 laid down
the rule that there must have been an opportunity for the defendant to
avert the injury by the exercise of ordinary care. It is obvious that, when
the same act is both a cause of the peril and causes the injury, there can be
no sufficient intervening time in which the defendant could act to avert the
injury. Certain later cases, however, allowed recovery under the humani-
tarian doctrine in that very situation.5 Despite those cases the supreme
court in Ridge v. Jones6 reverted to its position in the Vulgamott case by
refusing to apply the humanitarian doctrine on the ground that the plain-
tiff was not in a position of peril until defendant acted negligently, after
which defendant could have done nothing to avert the injury.
The court in Ridge v. Jones distinguished those cases allowing recovery
by saying that in the latter the plaintiffs were "in imminent peril if such
act was committed; not necessarily, perhaps that injury was certain to fol-
low the negligent act, but that peril was certain and imminent."7 It is
suggested that this distinction between certain peril and certain injury is
difficult of application and that any distinction on that basis does not seem
to be borne out by the factual situations of the cases.8 In the Ridge case
1. Duckworth v. Dent (Mo. App. 1939) 135 S. W. (2d) 28.
2. For a discussion of the Missouri humanitarian doctrine, see Gaines,
The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri (1935) 20 ST. Louis LAW REvimv
113; McCleary, The Bases of the Humanitarian Doctrine Reexamined
(1940) 5 Mo. L. Rev. 91.
3. State ex rel. Vulgamott v. Trimble (1923) 300 Mo. 92, 253 S. W.
1014; Gaines, supra note 2, at 122.
4. (1923) 300 Mo. 92, 253 S. W. 1014.
5. Bobos v. Krey Packing Co. (1927) 317 Mo. 108, 296 S. W. 157; Weed
v. American Car & Foundry Co. (1929) 322 Mo. 137, 14 S. W. (2d) 652;
Huckleberry v. Missouri Pac. R. R. (1930) 324 Mo. 1025, 26 S. W. (2d)
980; Menard v. Goltra (1931) 328 Mo. 368, 40 S. W. (2d) 1053.
6. (1934) 335 Mo. 219, 71 S. W. (2d) 713.
7. (1934) 335 Mo. 219, 225, 71 S. W. (2d) 713, 715.
8. Note the similarity betwen some of the fact situations distinguished:
e. g., in the Bobos case, plaintiff was injured due to the negligent starting of
a truck while he was climbing on it with his hand on the hand rail; in the
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as well as the others, once the defendant acted negligently peril was certain
and imminent.
The dissenting opinion in the instant case cites Ridge v. Jones as the
controlling authority for denying recovery under the humanitarian doctrine.9
It bases its conclusion on the ground that the fact situations in the two
cases are similar in nature. The majority of the court, though seemingly
not certain as to where the position of peril began,", finds the facts so
different from the facts in the Ridge case as to warrant holding that case
no authority for refusing to apply the humanitarian doctrine." This con-
flict in the court illustrates once more the difficulty of the Missouri courts
in defining the position of peril, a fundamental task in delimiting the
applicability of the humanitarian doctrine.' 2
A. M. E.
TRUSTS-NO-CONTEST CLAUSE-EFFECT OF PROBABLE CAUSE-CONTEST BY
BENEFICIARY AS ADINISTRATRIX-[Missouri].-Settlor by deed created a
trust under which he was the life beneficiary, the defendant and others to
be beneficiaries after his death. The deed provided that any beneficiary who
contested its validity would forfeit his rights.' Upon the death of the settlor-
life beneficiary, defendant, dissatisfied with her share as beneficiary, ob-
tained appointment as administratrx of settlor's estate2 and asked the
probate court to discover the estate assets. The trust deed was contested
by the administratrLx so that the corpus of the trust might be declared
assets of the estate; but the trust deed was upheld.' Trustees requested
Ridge case, plaintiff was injured due to the negligent starting of an auto-
mobile while he had his hand on the handle after getting out of the car.
9. Duckworth v. Dent (Mo. App. 1939) 135 S. W. (2d) 28, 39. Ridge v.
Jones has been cited for the rule that peril means something more than a
possibility that injury may result. Kirkham v. Jenkins Music Co. (1937)
340 Mo. 911, 916, 104 S. W. (2d) 234, 236; Edwards v. Terminal R. R.
Ass'n of St. Louis (1937) 341 Mo. 235, 238, 108 S. W. (2d) 140, 141. The
minority certified the case to the Supreme Court because of the alleged
conflict with the Ridge case.
10. The court holds that plaintiff was in a position of peril "especially
at the time the defendant started to shove the empty car backward." Duck-
worth v. Dent (Mo. App. 1939) 135 S. W. (2d) 28, 36. Quaere, as to
whether qualifying the position of peril by the use of the word "especially"
confuses the issue.
11. Duckworth v. Dent (Mo. App. 1939) 135 S. W. (2d) 28, 36.
12. Note the separate dissents of Ellison, C. J., and Gantt, J., Frank, J.,
concurring, in Perkins v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis (1937) 340 Mo.
868, 886, 896, 102 S. W. (2d) 915, 924, 930, as to whether plaintiff in that
case was in a position of peril.
1. Rossi v. Davis (Mo. 1939) 133 S. W. (2d) 363, 373, "'Should any of the
parties of the third part (of whom Mrs. Davis was one) * * * institute any
action or proceedings of any kind in any court at any time for the purpose
of setting aside this instrument, on any ground whatsoever, and be unsuccess-
ful therein * * *.'" (Italics supplied.)
2. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 63.
3. Davis v. Rossi (1930) 326 Mo. 911, 34 S. W. (2d) 8.
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